Direct Repossession vs Forwarding - Price vs Cost

Repossession Forwarding – Price vs Cost

Newspapers and TV crews love to tell stories about Repo Men, but the stories I’m seeing lately seem to be more about the Forwarding Industry than the Repossession Industry.

FROM USA TODAY 2/29/2009

Violence up between Repo Men, Car Owners

HALSELL, Ala. (AP) — Alone in his mobile home off a winding dirt road, Jimmy Tanks heard a commotion at 2:30 a.m. just outside his bedroom window: Somebody was messing with his car. The 67-year-old railroad retiree grabbed a gun, walked out the back door and confronted not a thief but a repo man and two helpers trying to tow off the Chrysler Sebring. Shots were fired, and Tanks wound up dead, a bullet in his chest.

The man who came to repossess the car, Kenneth Alvin Smith, is awaiting trial on a murder charge in a state considered a Wild West territory even by the standards of an industry that's largely unregulated nationally. Since Tanks' death last June, two other repo men from the same company Smith worked for were shot, one fatally.

Smith worked out of Birmingham with XXXXXXX Recovery (Repo agency) , a subsidiary of the Chicago-based XXXXXX Services (Forwarding Company). The same recovery firm employed a repo man who was shot and killed on Jan. 8 in Birmingham, as well as a third worker who was wounded while towing a vehicle in the city on Feb. 10.

I removed the name of the Repo Company and the Forwarding Company that hired them because my point is not to bad mouth a specific company, but to make a point about the state of the Forwarding Industry.

Before I do that, let me give you a little bit of history. I know a little bit about the “Forwarding Industry”. I started a company in 1994 called American Recovery Services, or ARS, as it’s known in the industry. It was one of, if not the first large volume Forwarding Companies, handling upwards of 50,000 assignments for repossession a year in the mid to late 90s.

We started it by accident. We had formed one of the first Skip Tracing companies that exclusively serviced the auto finance industry in 1988; Skipbusters. By the early 90s, we had several hundred Repossession Companies across the United States under contract to repossess the cars we located on the skip accounts we worked for large financial institutions.

One of our clients was VW Credit, and ironically, I had been one of the first VW Credit employees back in the early 80s when they first started financing cars in the US. VW had hired Chrysler Credit to manage the finance and collection process, and I was a Chrysler employee. By 1994, VW had split from Chrysler and they had gone out on their own, and I had done the same.
I’d landed VW as a client at the first repossession company I had started in 1990 with my wife and a business partner; Crown Recovery Services in L.A. By early 94, we’d sold our half of Crown and we’d started River City Auto Recovery at several locations in Northern California. We were doing all of VW’s repossessions in Northern California, and we were also were handling several hundred skips a month through Skipbusters.

While visiting VW’s HQ they asked us if we would be interested in managing their repossession process through our nationwide network. We did some research and formed ARS within a few weeks. We never called it “Forwarding”, in fact, we never even gave it a name other than ARS. By the late 90s, all the national auction houses had jumped in and started similar companies, and even Manheim got back into the business with their acquisition of ADT in 2000, even though in 1994 when I first started researching the formation of ARS, they told me they tried it a few years earlier on a small scale and almost immediately got out because it was just too difficult a business to manage. Interestingly, I heard last week they were recently sold to XXXX Forwarding company, probably a smart move on Manheim’s account, if they got a good price and didn’t have to guarantee revenue. It’s tough to run a successful Repossession company, and running a successful Forwarding company is even more challenging, in my opinion.

So yes, I know a little bit about the Forwarding Industry, and what I’ve seen recently is not something I’m proud of when my name is mentioned as a pioneer of this industry.

Here’s another recent, similar story:

From NBC Augusta, GA. 4/13/2009

Repo Man wanted for murder of Augusta Man

MARTINEZ, Ga. - A vehicle repossession turned deadly. The man called his lender to have his vehicle voluntarily repossessed. "As the reposessor was attempting to leave with the truck, he was causing damage to Mr. Jacob's vehicle, it was a van," said Captain Steve Morris with the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office.

"When the truck came forward, he hit me. I was able to push off and get out of the way," said the man. His friend of 20 years, William Jacobs, wasn't as lucky.

"They went diagonally across my front yard and I saw Bill falling and I saw the guy turn and he ran over him...and he never slowed down," said the man. Jacobs was taken to the hospital, where he died.

Now the couple who hit and killed him is on the run and wanted for murder.

Columbia County investigators are working with the repo company, (XXXXXX Forwarding Company) and XXXX (Tow Company) to help find XXXXX and XXXXXXX.

And here is another one…

Tow Truck Driver Arrested, Charged With Hit And Run

By RNW Staff Writer Hayden Jennings • on June 15, 2009 (Rome, GA.)

Police arrested a local tow truck driver for felony hit and run after he ran allegedly ran over a woman in what police are calling a car repo gone wrong. Residents began giving the driver problems after he failed to produce any paperwork dictating the repo. As the situation continued to escalate, the driver reportedly brandished a hand gun and jumped into the wrecker. At that time the victim, Tina Ferguson, 41, of the same address, walked in front of the wrecker and was struck by the front bumper. The collision sent Ferguson into a barrel roll beside the truck before she rolled under it and was struck by the rear wheels as the wrecker left the scene.

The common denominator is the unprofessional and downright criminal actions of the repossession agents in question. The other common denominator is the fact that most, if not all of these accounts were assigned by the finance company to a company they trusted to handle the management of the repossession process for them, i.e. Forwarding.

In 1994, I believed Forwarding was a good idea, and even today, it still makes sense for some clients who struggle with the repossession management process. The problem is that like everything else, costs of doing business have gone up, and as a result, many forwarding companies are lowering the rates they are willing to pay the repo agent in the field to make sure they can make their needed, or desired margins. I’ve heard some repo companies offering their prospective agents $225 or $250 a repossession, and half that on a voluntary, which very well may be why there are two towing companies mentioned in the stories above.

If you wanted to get Lasix surgery on your eyes, would you hire someone who doesn’t use the best equipment, isn’t licensed, or doesn’t have a successful track record with solid references? Repossessing a car isn’t performing surgery on someone’s eyes, but if I own a finance company and I know what I have learned in the nearly thirty years I’ve spent in this industry, I’m not hiring a tow truck driver to pick up a voluntary just because he will do it for less than a qualified repossessor. I’m also not hiring the cheapest repo guy in town unless I’ve made damn sure he is also the best in town, and those two denominators do not usually mix.

I believe Forwarding companies hire these second class repo and tow jockeys because the deal they cut with the finance company is based more on price than it is on results. They also do this because the finance company doesn’t hold them accountable unless a serious problem arises, and the finance company doesn’t perform the due diligence they should be doing before they give them their first assignment. If they did, many of these Forwarding companies wouldn’t pass the test, and then the one’s who do Forwarding would only be able to perform the services at a certain rate, because otherwise they would go out of business as it’s not inexpensive to properly run a legitimate Forwarding business, Skip Tracing Agency, or Repossession Agency for that matter. The Finance Company would also make sure they knew exactly who the repossession company was contracting with, and instead of not wanting to know, they would demand to know not only who their approved agents are, they would audit them and ask to see the contracts, their insurance policies and the endorsements naking the Forwarding company, and they would perform an acid test on their Forwarding companies policies, procedures and practices to insure that an assignment to a sub-standard repossession agency, or an unlicensed or unqualified tow company would never happen on one of their assignments.

Since I started in this industry in 1982, most clients I’ve known have been focused on getting their repossessions performed for a lower price. I was trained this way at Chrysler. Once I started my first repossession company, I started to see the other side of the picture. Through the years, I’ve built relationships with a few forward thinking clients who have allowed us to charge a fair fee that could be evaluated and renegotiated as we delivered or exceeded their desired results. As I’m building Find John Doe, I’m trying to work with clients who think this way, and I applaud the vendors we do work with who hold their companies to the same core business values. If a client asks us to perform a skip locate for less than our normal rate, I tell them that I just can’t do it as I’ve built an organization that produces results, and we have a level of expected results we have to meet or we would go out of business. Lowering our revenue by even a few dollars makes it that much harder to meet our expectations, and our employees expectations. We work from a results-driven fee basis. If we don’t find people and get the collateral recovered, we make no money. This means I have to build an organization that finds people, or at least enough people to make up for the one’s I don’t find.

Many repo agents say contingency is bad, and while I agree to some degree, it is the way our industry has been built. It will take a long time and some forward thinking clients to make a change. I believe if the repossession fee is high enough to cover the accounts that are not repossessed, and if there is a secondary fee that can be generated for the agent who gets out of his truck and generates a positive resolution, and most importantly, if the repossession company gets a positive resolution on a majority of the accounts they receive, they can make a profit. If they spread themselves too thin and try and cover too large a service area, the chances of making a profit are reduced. If they take on more work than they can handle, the chances of making a profit and building lasting client relationships are reduced. Based on my experience, I’m confident that if the agents we contract with can track their results and build relationships with our company based on results and trust, they can grow a solid business.

The only problem with this is there are times when our industry makes no sense, and then it’s almost as if we have to start all over again in trying to legitimize what we do. A typical example of this is when a client assigns an account for repossession and lets say the balance is $20K. If the agent repossesses the car, the client pays them between $325 and $395 on average, and then the car goes to auction and they lose around $10K. If the repo agent makes contact and as a result the customer pays the account current, avoiding a repossession and a potential $10K loss, the client doesn’t pay the agent more money, they usually pay them considerably less, and in some cases they pay them nothing.

As I approach my fiftieth birthday and the twilight years of my career in this industry, it would be nice if I could have a hand in helping clients see the benefits of building relationships with their vendors that are results based, with fair fees paid to the vendors that are justified by a solid ROI for the client, and for the vendor.

In another example, I had an agent tell me the other day that they had a client giving them about 100 accounts a month for the past several years and they were charging somewhere in the range of $350. They tracked their stats and were getting close to 90% of the accounts either repossessed, or the people would pay from the direct contact they were making in the field and they charged them a $150 cure fee. The agent said they were considering asking the finance company for a 5-10% raise because the cost of fuel, state of the art technology, health and unemployment insurance increases and now that their staff was more experienced, their staffing costs had gone up and as a result of these expenses, their profits had been reduced to barely above a break even at $325 a repo, even when they got 90% closed or recovered. The agent called and asked for my opinion and I suggested they open their books and show the client how their margins had been cut, but their performance had been consistent and even if they couldn’t raise their fees enough in one year to make up the difference, maybe they could get a 5% raise, and an extra 5% if they increased their positive resolution to 92% from 90%.

I didn’t hear back from the agent and about a month later I put in a call to follow up. Unfortunately, what I heard was not surprising. Before they made that call they got a call from the new collection supervisor who said they would have to reduce their price to $325 or they wouldn’t receive any more business as they were going with a national forwarding company who was charging $325 a repo.

This is a typical example of a story I hear many times over. If the Forwarder is charging $325, then what are they paying the repo company and what is the quality of the repossessor they’re getting for $225 or $250 - see above stories for the correct answer. How much will the lawsuits in the above stories cost the finance companies? I guarantee it will be seven figures, plus the intangible bad press every finance company seems to be most scared of.

In this example, if the forwarder still got them a 90% recovery rate on an annual basis, they would be saving $25 per repossession, or a total of $27,000 for the year. I’ll bet the average charge off this finance company pays for every full balance skip charge off is about $15,000. So, if the Forwarding company got them a 70% recovery rate, which is a high rate for a typical forwarding company, that would be 20 less repossessions a month, or 240 less a year. At $15,000 per charge off, that’s a loss of about three and a half million dollars a year.

As I’ve said, using a company to help you manage the repossession process can be a benefit, but make sure you hold them accountable. If you have a repossession agent that’s getting you 80% or higher and they meet your other requirements, use the forwarder in the areas where your percentages are less, or in remote areas, and keep the company who has earned your trust and find a way to incentivize them to get an even higher percentage and pay them what they’re worth.

“Is it Price you’re concerned about, or is it cost?” One of the most famous sales consultants of our time, Zig Ziglar, wrote the gospel to this question, and ultimately it’s answer. If you haven’t heard him speak on this topic, please take the time to Google his name and listen to one of his podcasts, which are available on line for free. It certainly can be applied to the Repossession and the Forwarding industries.

WSJ Page 1 article Dec 6, 2007 "Surge in Auto-Loan Delinquencies.."

From the front page of today's Wall Street Journal... Subprime average delinquency on 2006 loans hits 12% in Sept 2007, up from 11% in Aug 07, and Prime DQ goes from 2.9% to 4.5% from Aug 2007 to Sept 2007 - those are some pretty sharp increases.

Here is the article:


Surge in Auto-Loan Delinquencies
Is Latest Trouble for the Economy
By JEFFREY MCCRACKEN and GREGORY ZUCKERMAN
December 6, 2007; Page A1

First came housing loans and the subprime-mortgage crisis.

Now, signs of stress are creeping into another key consumer area: auto loans.

Delinquencies in the auto-loan market are ticking up to their highest level in several years. Lenders are tightening terms in some cases, and interest rates have risen from the rock-bottom levels of a few years ago. About $575 billion in loans for new and used cars are made annually, according to the National Automotive Finance Association.

About 4.5% of auto loans made in 2006 to top-rated borrowers were at least 30 days delinquent as of the end of September, up from 2.9% the previous month, according to a Lehman Brothers survey of companies servicing these loans. That is the biggest one-month jump in at least eight years. Lehman says 12% of subprime borrowers, who have poorer credit records, were delinquent on their 2006 auto loans as of September. That is the highest level since 2002 and up from 11.1% the previous month.

"The numbers will get worse for auto loans," says Dan Castro of GSC Group, a New York firm that runs debt-related investment funds. "We're starting to see signs of rising losses, and delinquencies are creeping up."

Few in the auto-loan industry see the strain as the kind of disaster-in-the-making that home mortgages have become. Still, there is a connection between the two categories, since the squeeze on some home borrowers may make it harder to carry car loans. The trouble signs in auto loans suggest that the credit woes could be spreading to the broader economy, a development that has been worrying investors and policy makers in Washington.

Other corners of the credit market are also sending troublesome signals. Shares of First Marblehead Corp., which packages student loans into securities, dropped to a two-year low yesterday after an analyst cut his rating on the stock and Moody's Investors Service threatened to downgrade some of its securities, also because of delinquency concerns.

Car loans differ from home loans in one crucial way. During 2004-06, many home loans were made to speculators on the assumption that the underlying asset -- the home -- was sure to keep rising in value. Many people, inspired by fervor in the market, took out home loans that in retrospect they had little hope of paying back.

By contrast, everyone understands that the car behind a car loan is an asset destined to lose value. The typical delinquent borrower in a car loan isn't a speculator but someone who became unable to make what previously seemed like a manageable payment. That is why car delinquencies are closely linked to the health of the economy.

"Auto-loan defaults tend to be event-driven, like a job loss or an unexpected health-care bill or a divorce," says Dan Berce, chief executive of AmeriCredit Corp., one of the country's largest subprime auto lenders. "We watch quite closely economic indicators like unemployment rate, weekly job claims or hours worked."

In the second quarter, borrowers were at least 30 days behind on 2.77% of all auto loans made by nonbank lenders, the main players in the market, according to the American Bankers Association. That was the highest delinquency rate since 1991.

Many auto loans undergo the same Wall Street financial engineering as the mortgage loans that stand at the center of the credit crisis, making this a potential issue for investors. Auto loans often are bundled together into securities, sliced and diced into pieces with varying levels of risk and return, and sold to investors around the world.

In 2006, $89 billion of auto loans were packaged into asset-backed securities and sold to investors, according to Standard & Poor's, making it the biggest asset class for such securities next to mortgages and credit cards. That tally doesn't include certain other types of securities backed by car loans. The market is now slowing. Deutsche Bank estimates such bundling was down to $69 billion during the first 11 months of this year, a 19% drop from the same period last year.

Borrower problems also could deal a blow to the already-struggling auto industry. Auto sales held up during the 2001 recession in part because lenders were able to offer easy borrowing terms. If lenders tighten terms in response to the delinquencies, it would make it harder for some people to buy cars.

U.S. auto sales are down about 2.5% this year, and the auto industry is bracing for sales to decline further in 2008. Interest rates on auto loans have increased to nearly 8% from about 6.5% in late 2004, according to J.D. Power & Associates.

The auto-loan-delinquency problem is somewhat less severe for two lenders associated with the top two U.S. car makers -- Ford Motor Co.'s Ford Credit, and GMAC Financial Services, which is 49%-owned by General Motors Corp. That is because Ford Credit and GMAC don't handle many subprime loans.

GMAC Treasurer David Walker said auto-loan delinquencies in the third quarter were the highest in at least three years, partly because of economic factors, but he said credit losses are still well within historical levels. Separately, GMAC is struggling with the fallout of the subprime-mortgage crisis because one of its units was a big home lender.

AmeriCredit, of Fort Worth, Texas, is also experiencing stress. The company makes about 500,000 new- and used-auto loans a year, valued at about $9 billion, some of which get sold to investors.

In the quarter ending Sept. 30, AmeriCredit reported net income of $61.8 million, down from $74.2 million for the period a year ago. It also lowered fiscal-2008 profit projections, blaming poorer-performing 2006 auto loans. AmeriCredit shares traded at $10.32 in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading yesterday, down 18 cents from the day before and 59% lower for the year to date.

There are reasons to believe the problems in auto loans won't reach crisis levels. Auto lenders and credit counselors say many consumers see their cars as a necessity and would sooner hand back the keys to a home and look for a rental than default on a car loan.

Auto lenders and dealers note that the monthly payment on a car is smaller than a mortgage payment. Most auto loans carry fixed interest rates, unlike subprime mortgages, which often reset to a higher rate after an introductory "teaser" period of two or three years.

Still, auto loans, like home loans, saw credit standards loosen in 2005 and 2006. CarMax Inc., of Richmond, Va., the largest used-car retailer in the country, said at the end of 2005 it lowered lending standards. For example, it allowed consumers to put down less money to buy more expensive vehicles. Car Max made about 140,000 car loans last year.

"We had been too strict and wanted to make more loans and maximize profitability. We expected our delinquencies and losses would go up, but they are up higher than we thought," said Katharine Kenny, head of investor relations at CarMax.

Some subprime auto lenders, such as Capital One Financial Corp., say they are seeing higher risks in parts of the country where home prices are falling the hardest, such as California and Florida. Lenders say rising delinquencies are also tied to higher fuel prices and slowing job growth.

Mr. Berce said rising delinquency rates prompted AmeriCredit to tighten its lending standards early this year and it will reassess the matter next month. It is now demanding that borrowers put down more cash against the value of the cars they are buying, especially among consumers with lower credit scores. Mr. Berce said this tightening of standards could reduce lending volume by about 10%.

--John D. Stoll contributed to this article.

Write to Jeffrey McCracken at jeff.mccracken@wsj.com and Gregory Zuckerman at gregory.zuckerman@wsj.com